Put you in the problem: Effects of self-pronouns on mathematical problem-solving.

Self-cues such as personal pronouns are known to elicit processing biases, such as attention capture and prioritisation in working memory. This may impact the performance of tasks that have a high attentional load like mathematical problem-solving. Here, we compared the speed and accuracy with which children solved numerical problems that included either the self-cue "you," or a different character name. First, we piloted a self-referencing manipulation with N = 52, 7 to 11 year-olds, testing performance on addition and subtraction problems that had either a single referent ("You"/"Sam") or more than one referent. We took into account operation and positioning of the pronoun and also measured performance on attention and working memory tasks. We found a robust accuracy advantage for problems that included "you," regardless of how many characters were included. The accuracy advantage for problems with a self-pronoun was not statistically associated with individual differences in attention or working memory. In our main study (9 to 11 year-olds, N = 144), we manipulated problem difficulty by creating consistently and inconsistently worded addition and subtraction problems. We found significantly higher speed and accuracy for problems that included "you." However, this effect varied by task difficulty, with the self-pronoun effect being strongest in the most difficult inconsistently worded, subtraction problems. The advantage of problems with a self-pronoun was not associated with individual differences in working memory. These findings suggest that self-cues like the pronoun "you" can be usefully applied in numerical processing tasks, an effect that may be attributable to the effects of self-cues on attention.

Cognitive prerequisites for cumulative culture are context-dependent: Children's potential for ratcheting depends on cue longevity.

Human cumulative culture has been suggested to depend on human-unique cognitive mechanisms, explaining its apparent absence in other species. We show that the potential for exhibiting cumulative culture depends on the cognitive abilities of the agents and the demands associated with using information generated by others' activity. 154 children aged 3-6 years played a searching game ("Find the Treasure"), taking their turn after a puppet demonstrator. The puppet's attempt revealed information about the contents of the locations searched, which could be exploited to target rewarded locations, and avoid unrewarded ones. Two conditions were presented, intended to capture realistic variation in the transience of the cues generated by another individual's activity. In one condition, the puppet's demonstration provided transient information - boxes were opened, seen to be rewarded or not, and then closed. In the other condition the puppet's chosen boxes remained partially open, providing an enduring visible cue as to whether that location was rewarded. Children undertook three trials of varying demonstration success, and we used patterns of performance to infer the potential for improvement over multiple generations of transmission. In the Enduring Cues condition, children's performance demonstrated the potential for cumulative culture. In contrast, in the Transient Information condition, only older children showed improved performances following higher success demonstrations and overall performance was not compatible with the possibility of improvements over generations of social transmission. We conclude that under certain conditions cumulative culture could occur in many species, but in a broader range of contexts in humans.

Experimental assessment of capacities for cumulative culture: Review and evaluation of methods.

In the current literature, there are few experimental tests of capacities for cumulative cultural evolution in nonhuman species. There are even fewer examples of such tests in young children. This limited evidence is noteworthy given widespread interest in the apparent distinctiveness of human cumulative culture, and the potentially significant theoretical implications of identifying related capacities in nonhumans or very young children. We evaluate experimental methods upon which claims of capacities for cumulative culture, or lack thereof, have been based. Although some of the established methods (those simulating generational succession) have the potential to identify positive evidence that fulfills widely accepted definitions of cumulative culture, the implementation of these methods entails significant logistical challenges. This is particularly true for testing populations that are difficult to access in large numbers, or those not amenable to experimental control. This presents problems for generating evidence that would be sufficient to support claims of capacities for cumulative culture, and these problems are magnified for establishing convincing negative evidence. We discuss alternative approaches to assessing capacities for cumulative culture, which circumvent logistical problems associated with experimental designs involving chains of learners. By inferring the outcome of repeated transmission from the input-output response patterns of individual subjects, sample size requirements can be massively reduced. Such methods could facilitate comparisons between populations, for example, different species, or children of a range of ages. We also detail limitations and challenges of this alternative approach, and discuss potential avenues for future research. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Dissociable processes for orientation discrimination learning and contextual illusion magnitude.

Previous research suggests an inverse relationship between human orientation discrimination sensitivity and tilt illusion magnitude. To test whether these perceptual functions are inherently linked, we measured both orientation discrimination sensitivity and the magnitude of the tilt illusion before and after participants had been trained for three days on an orientation discrimination task. Discrimination sensitivity improved with training and this improvement remained one month after the initial learning. However, tilt illusion magnitude remained unchanged before and after orientation training, at either trained or untrained orientations. Our results suggest that orientation discrimination sensitivity and illusion magnitude are not inherently linked. They also provide further evidence that, at least for the training periods we employed, perceptual learning of orientation discrimination may involve high-level processes.